In the summer of 1977, Leonard Woodcock had become the chief of the U.S. liaison office in Peking, Sec of State Cyrus Vance visited Beijing in August, a month later. Vance said US would recognize PRC as sole legal government and let defense treaty with Taiwan lapse, but some US personnel would have to remain in Taiwan under an informal arrangement. Not rejected out of hand by the Chinese. News story that followed claimed China showed unexpected flexibility in talks. Deng outraged. This stalled normalization effort. Was opening shot in fight over China policy between head of the NSC Brzezinski and the State Department. Brzezinski may have been the source of the leak to the press.
End of year Brzezinski increasingly proponent of normalization with China. As a counter to Moscow. China invited him in early November of 1977, invitation. February 1978, B meet with Han Xu several times, acting chief of Chinese liaison office in Washington. May, 1978, B to Beijing with entourage. Desired security cooperation with China to counter Russia. Brought with him "gifts" that were certain to impress.
Vietnam attacked Kampuchea [Cambodia] and in two weeks, at Christmas, drove from power China's only ally in Southesast Asia, the Khmer Rouge, genocidal policies. Summer 1978 expelled from Vietnam the overseas Chinese. June, 1978, began unpublicized bombing of Cambodia. As many as thirty sorties a day. November 1, Le Duan landed in Moscow with five members of the Soviet Politburo to greet him. November 3, signed 25 year treaty of friendship & cooperation. Article Six, insurance for Vietnam against Chinese attack. "If either side is attacked or exposed to the threat of attack, the two signatory powers will immediately confer with each other in order to remove this threat and take appropriate and effective steps to safeguard the peace and security of both countries." Soviet navy and air forces in Vietnam soon after.
Beijing conference on November 11 to December 15, watershed in Chinese politics. Zhao Ziyang brought in now as secretary-general of the party Central Committee.
As prepared for war, Deng cited US military intelligence estimates of Soviet troops strength along Chinese border. Said attack would not interrupt China's Four Modernizations, and said that even if 70 percent of war objectives achieve, the 30 percent failure would serve as stimulus for military improvement.
Vietnam attacks on December 24, 1978. January 6 crossed Mekong at Neak Luong January 7, Phnom Penh liberated.
End of January, 225,000 troops along border of Vietnam. December 15, normalize relations with China. Saturday, February 17, attack at 26 points along the border. March 5, had occupied Lang San and gateway to Red River delta. Same day announced would withdraw. A sixteen day "pedagogical war"
Out of the unfortunate costly experience of that brief conflict, the Chinese were able to form a cooperative and partly clandestine military relationship with the United States. The relationship was forged, at first, during the visit of National. Security Adviser Brzezinski and his entourage to Beijing in May, 1978. Then it was confirmed upon Deng Xiaoping's visit to the United States in January, 1979, when indicated to President Jimmy Carter and his National Security Adviser that China planned to move militarily against the Vietnamese. Publicly, the Carter administration sought to distance itself from supporting the military actions of the Chinese. Carter was concerned about upsetting the progress toward a Salt II agreement with the Soviet Union, and so acted with extreme caution publicly so as not to upset the delicate negotiations with the Soviet Union. But Brzezinski was pleased by the prospect of the Chinese punishing the Vietnamese, and had difficulty concealing his delight.
First, not only was Deng not advised not to make the undertaking, but he was secretly offered American help in the enterprise.
During Brzezinski's visit, secret American information was shown to the Chinese. Satellite photographs, classified estimates of Soviet strength and so on. The Chinese were amazed by the openness of the Americans in this regard, who gave them absolutely everything they wanted. Brzezinski promised more, always more. And he asked almost nothing in return. The Chinese became at that time the beneficiaries of American largess thanks to American attitudes toward the Soviet Union, strangely enough, and Soviet hegeminism in Africa and in Southeast Asia.
Within the Carter Administration, Brzezinski had become the most outspoken proponent of normalization of relations with The People's Republic of China as a counterbalance to Moscow. In the fall of 1977, the Chinese government extended an invitation to Brzezinski to visit Beijing. He met several times for private discussions with Han Xu, the acting chief of the Chinese liaison office in Washington in February 1978, and in May flew to China with his carefully selected entourage.
Brzezinski came bearing gifts and the Chinese were delighted, on the one hand, and almost disbelieving on the other. "Eventually, we would cultivate American friends. Some of them were overseas Chinese. And none of these were party members. I recall asking about this. 'How can we trust them if they are not party members?' I asked my immediate superior. He laughed. 'There is no need for that, he said.' They serve the party and its objectives better than most members.' The reason I recall that statement at this point is that Mr. Brzezinski certainly fell into that category. By his policies, his enthusiastic cooperation and his help, he served the party better than most of those who were members. It was almost too good to be true."
Brzezinski, self-righteous individual who was marked deeply by the Soviet Union's policy toward his native Poland, wanted cooperation with China to counter the Soviet Union. Brought with him "gifts" that were certain to impress the Chinese. Samuel Huntington, an NSC staff member, shared with the Chinese hosts a top secret NSA assessment -- Presidential Review Memorandum 10 --of the current world situation, especially with regard to the Soviet power. This was impressive, the Chinese felt.
Brzezinski then confided that the American regulations concerning sale of "dual use" technology to China would be relaxed soon and that the US would no longer oppose arms sales by its alliance partners to China. Accompanying Brzenzski on the trip was Benjamin Huberman, assistant to the President's science and technology adviser, and Morton Abramowitz, deputy assistant sec of defense for international security. A senior Chinese defense official met separately with Abramowitz. The American, who spoke Mandarin, gave a dazzling presentation for more than one hour, of highly classified material dealing with the deployment of Soviet forces along the Chinese border. This sharing of intelligence at the defense ministry level impressed the Chinese. Abramovitz also provided Chinese information about Soviet strategic weapons. But as his final surprise, he pulled from his briefcase a sheaf of top secret reconnaissance photographs of Soviet military installations and armor facing China. Huberman also spoke separately with Chinese defense officials concerning Sino-American cooperation in science and technology and brought up the possibility of a secret joint venture to monitor Soviet nuclear and missile testing sites. Brzezinski also offered the Chinese "eyes and ears of the West." US also agreed that the US would set up, install, man, equip and service series of SIGINT(signal intelligence) stations along Sino-Soviet border.
"Zbig was trying to tantalize the Chinese" by "giving them hints that they could expect a lot more from us," one member of the delegation remarked later. Another. William Gleysteen, wrote a memo attacking Brzezinski's tactics. The NSA adviser, he said, had raised Chinese expectations of obtaining American support that hadn't been approved or discussed at the highest levels of the US government. Brzezinski, in his traditional manner, ignored the memo. And he did deliver on his promises to the Chinese, as we shall see.
Two days later Deng Xiaoping arrived in Bangkok. Denounced Soviet "hegemonists" Deng suggested in private that "Phnom Penh will fall." Suggested didn't like policies of Pol Pot, but would not allow strategic area to fall to Vietnam. Several days later in Singapore, spoke to leaders there. "These ungrateful people must be punished. We gave them $20 billion of aid, Chinese sweat, and blood and look what happened." When Prime Minister Lee Kwan Yew asked him how he would punish them, he said, "We have ways and means."
At that time the Paracel Islands,( Xi Sia) the Chinese had captured them in 1974 and we were building on those islands now, a short airstrip. And the islands were still at that time in the hands of the navy and the responsibility of the navy. And so at that time a Soviet Task force, a very formidable one, all of a sudden headed into the South China Sea towards the Paracel Islands, like a show of force against us. And the navy had to prepare itself for this because all of the major warships, like the destroyers, they were all concentrated in the North, near Liushan and Tsingtao and all we had in the area were lighter ships like frigates, and these were the only things that we had at that time.
So at that time, the South China Sea navy was put on alert, and the Soviets responded on the Sea to show us that they were loyal to their friends. So the Navy was extremely concerned. So there were immediate reinforcements of the fighter forces from the Naval air arm. Emergency measures were taken in the South near Hainan Island, and all of the forces in the light forces were concentrated and put on red alert. The torpedo boats, what was so funny is that they were missile boats, not torpedoes, they were missile boats, each capable of firing four, China had only one kind, but hundreds of them, they were for this missile boat, because of the limited range, they were forced, to maintain a force at sea close to the Paracels, these boats, they made a sortee out to a certain range then stayed there for about half an hour and returned. The range was short. So they were then rotated in that area. But they could not stay there in the battle zone for long, and once they the missile boats patrolled another group left port to replace them and so when they were low on fuel they were replaced by boats both from the Paracels and Hainan. And at that time the General Commander and the political commissar of the navy were called to the South from Beijing. This was it. They were ready for a fight with the Soviets. The destroyers, meanwhile, were called from the North, but it took them a time to get there, after the Russians had converge don the islands. And so it was the missile boats and the submarines that had to defend the islands, along with fighter cover and frigates. The navy thought this was enough to protect the islands, but there was still a concentration of Soviet forces with not only destroyers but also cruisers heavily armed with missiles, and they were very apprehensive of this. This task force was without an aircraft carrier. Only surface vessels approaching the Paracels. And the frigates were there, too. Because the range was limited, and so they stayed for half an hour and then returned to port. They were there day and night to defend the islands. We were also receiving intelligence from the US on the movements of the Soviet fleet.
But at that time, there was a fortuitous coincidence, in that behind the Soviet surface group, an American task force followed the Soviets at a great distance, followed by an aircraft carrier, the Coral Sea. [CVA 43], I remember the number was. The Soviets were aware of that, of course.
What happened is that the Americans were following them, and they knew that the Chinese navy was vulnerable at that time. The Russians knew they could knock out the Chinese navy but at a cost, a big cost. The Soviets were superior in fire power, but they had fewer ships, but higher in tonnage. So once they lost one ship that would be a big loss for them. We didn't know, whatever the reason, as they approached the Paracels, they suddenly changed course, they made a sharp turn to the East and left the zone. What a surprise, and then the Americans quietly departed too behind them.
So our navy was extremely relieved at that time, seeing the Soviets gone. My God, we thought. This was to be the only Soviet response against the Chinese for the Vietnam invasion and now it had been terminated. The fleet came, probably from the Indian Ocean. They were there. The planned this sailing for some time and had planned well for it. They showed their force perhaps to impress the Vietnamese and to scare the Chinese. The Chinese navy figured out that what the Russians probably wanted to do was to shell the island and scare us and make us think that there would be more to come if they didn't withdraw from Vietnam. But they were surprised, suddenly, to find that the Chinese was working, it almost seemed, in coordination with the American navy. We saw all of this on radar and they saw the Americans behind them on radar.
There was no concern at that time, keep in mind, with what the Khmer Rouge were doing to their own people in Cambodia. None at all. No matter how brutal. They were friends to China. That is the only thing we cared about. They wanted to see their friends in power. As to what they do in power, with power, well that is the internal affair of a foreign country. That should by no means be interfered with by an outside power. China included. What you do is your own business. So long as you are my friend, that is important. And by that time, too, China felt somewhat ashamed, as far as I saw it, because they knew that the Navy was not strong enough, and they were unable to support the Khmer Rouge when they were under fire. So they just hate the Vietnamese for that. We were proven to be helpless. We saw the Vietnamese occupy everything. So we had to do something.
This included detachments of the Seventh Fleet being sent into the South China Sea as a counterbalance to the Soviet fleet that came there And during the war, they sent an American naval battle group to the Gulf of Tonkin in order to protect Chinese naval forces on the Paracel Islands. They also arranged for secret delivery to the Chinese navy of two much- needed Mark 46 torpedoes, that the we badly needed for their fleet in order to effectively confront the forces of the soviet union." The Chinese hoped to reverse manufacture similar models from the American models. This proved impossible and in the mid-1980s, China began buying Mark-46s from the US.
During the conflict, also, the Iranian revolution and the fall of the Shah(He fled from Tehran on January 16) and the American public and the American media seemed riveted to Iran rather than to Southeast Asia and events occurring there. Of critical importance in the shifting relationship with Iran was the fact that America lost important listening posts to spy on the Soviet Union and watch the deployment of soviet missiles. The secret posts at Bihshahr and Kabkan in northern Iran. Kabkan as the most important listening post the US operated for monitoring Russian missile and space launch activity. The United States CIA carefully monitored Soviet missile and space activities from those posts. The Bihshahr stationed closed in December, 1978, but the Kapkan site operated until Iranian employees mutinied, demanded backpay and held the American technicians stationed there captive. A special ransom was eventually paid to the employees, the American CIA employees were flown out and the post fell into the hands of the local Iranians. As a result, the Carter administration was then shopping around for a new site to monitor Soviet activities. The friendship and secret alliance forged with the Chinese provided the opportunity to establish that new site after the war with Vietnam. The needs of the Chinese and the Americans suddenly against the Soviet Union, a common enemy, helped forge an unlikely and sometimes embarrassing alliance. and secret alliance. The Chinese were able to make another deal with the Carter administration, offering to set up a new listening post in Northwest China at a secret outpost just outside Urumchi. The project, called Project 851 by the Chinese, began in 1980 with construction on the site in Xinjiang province close to Tian Mountain "Sky Mountain". It involves American software and Hardware, about 100 personnel from the NSA and an equal number of Chinese military personnel who occupy the post with the Americans and have been trained to use American spy materials. This post, 851, had been over the years, absolutely uninterrupted by the domestic situation in China. As the Chinese say of the post, "politics is politics and busines is business." They look on the 851 project as a business propostion.
Deng stated that if China achieved 70 percent of its objective, that would be all right, since the 30 percent would be a stimulus to make military improvements.
Deng's visit to Washington. Tip O'Neill compared the Vietnamese in Cambodia as the Japanese in Manchuria.
February 17 attack, artillery opening up. A sixteen day "pedagogical war". Begins with tremendous artillery barrage. From distance, American reporter wrote, sounded like B52 attack. strike. But on once occasion the barrage lasted twenty minutes rather than usual minute for an American bombing run. 85,000 Chinese troops cross the border, supported by armor, at 26 points.
Delivery of photographs. The NSA satellite photographs were delivered to the Chinese. While the naval crisis going on in the south, when virtually all general commanders of navy dispatched to Xisa and Paracel islands to supervise naval operations, while at this same time, in Beijing, in western suburb, on road called the Fuxing Road, in western suburb, located at the naval compound, while a high six story building, colored yellow, everything inside marbeled, on the second floor is communications intelligence and naval operations divisions of the naval headquarters. In the charting room of the operations room, the officers roaming about, carrying the latest information about the movements of the US task force and the approaching Soviet task force that was detected by the Chinese navy's own monitoring posts on the southern coast line as well as the pictures forwarded to the naval operations by the third department of the General Staff. because it was the third department that was actually the one that was receiving directly the pictures. From the US defense attache and his staff, situated in Beijing. these were directly received through special deciphering technologies of the demodulation devices for the high resolution photographs taken by the US Black Birds that were actually watching the movements of the soviet fleet and the ground troops in formation along the Sino Soviet border. at that time China was extremely concerned about the possible soviet retaliation against the northern movements of these troops. In the US embassy, the major compound, first floor, to the right.
Mark 46s. after they were picked up, by fishermen, instantly reported to the navy, and they dispatched divers to supervise the salvage operation and they successfully got the two torpedoes out. this operation labeled in significance as the rescue operation that they had in 1969 when China was having war with soviet union in Heilongjiang Province. Because t that time a Soviet T62 tank after it was hit by Chinese military forces, it sank into the iced river of Wusuli River. This tank sank through the ice and sank to the bottom. China had major operation of rescuing this tank, because it sank on the China side of the river. but the Soviet detected the Chinese movements, knowing that they wanted to recover it. so the soviets kept shelling the surface of the water and the area, wanted to sink it further and destroy it, race against time, and China raced to pull it out. the navy dispatched special divers in the freezing water and successfully got it out with a long cable, these people later cited for heroism since it so cold, impossible for them stay in for more than few minutes./ Later studied and placed in the Beijing military museum, nicknamed it "Turtle Shell(Wu Gwei ke). The recovery of the Mark 46 was ranked in significance with the getting of the T 62 from the soviet union.
Studied the Mark 46 torpedoes. Took them apart, disassembled them, and while then sent different parts to different research instituted for study purposes, enabled the Chinese research institutes that belonged to CSSC(China State Shipbulding Corporation) and to successfully make their own copies of the Mark 46. They made these for study and then test fired them in special testing pool in a suburb of Kunming. A very nice pool, specially for acoustic testing purposes, once you throw a stone in it, in the monitoring screen you can see a reflection of the sound and the graphics, perfect acoustical lab. Used it to test these Mark 46 copies, only to find that everything looked exactly the same with what they captured except for the performance. So it took 2 more years to get perfect copy, why all the parts looked the same but could not achieve same level of performance that Mark 46 should have. So the research project continued, until China officially obtained the Mark 46 later 1987. From the US.
Later in those negotiations room of the Systematic Engineering Division of the CSSC, which is not far from pretty close to the naval compound, and the American friends gave the technical introductions of the Mark 46, advanced version. And the Chinese top experts questioned the American specialists about the possible modifications of the Mark 46 used by the US navy compared to the earlier versions. what revolutionary advances had the US made. The Am experts said that not at all. But actually the Chinese top experts on the China side of the table, could hardly hold their laughter, since they knew the truth, they knew that the Americans were lying, they knew what changes had been made. But the Americans there never knew how Chines knew that. These experts were from the sales department of the Mark 46 manufacturer.
After the 1979 war against Vietnam, Deng was absolutetly convinced that the Chinese military needed modernization. Later he specifically pointed out that defense modernization priorities should be given to the Navy, Airforce and Second Artillery corps. And so ever since then this above mentioned services have been actively engaged in foreign advanced technology and weaponry introduction into the PLA. And in order to make sure that nothing goes wrong on the diplomatic front, no spies or secret information, the top national security ministry assigned one agent to each military service, to supervise the operation and security aspect of the operation,dealing with foreigners. To make sure nothing went wrong, they are to be both reliable and trustworthy and competent, have to know the technological aspects of what goes on. Same time have to be trustworthy and loyal. And the one sent to the navy was a female, her name is and she happened to always go the extra mile in her work.(go on from there)(tape at home).
[The Chinese war with Vietnam, in February, 1979, was an unusually bloody confrontation. The Chinese may have lost, in one month of fighting in Vietnam, nearly as many men as the Americans lost in nearly a decade of fighting in Vietnam. Chinese statistics on the war are, however, notoriously unreliable.
Out of the unfortunate costly experience of that brief conflict, the Chinese were able to form a cooperative and partly clandestine military relationship with the United States. The relationship was forged, at first, during Deng Xiaoping's visit to the United States in January, 1979, when indicated to President Jimmy Carter and his National Security Advisor that China planned to move militarily against the Vietnamese. Publicly, the Carter administration sought to distance itself from supporting the military actions of the Chinese. Privately and secretly, they offered critical aid to the Chinese. And during the war, they sent an American naval battle group to the Gulf of Tonkin in order to protect Chinese naval forces on the Paracel Islands. They arranged for secret delivery to the Chinese navy of two much needed Mark 46 torpedoes, that the Chinese badly needed for their submarine fleet in order to effectively confront the forces of the soviet union. The Chinese hoped to reverse manufacture similar models from the American models. This proved impossible and in the mid-1980s, China began buying Mark-46s from the US.
During the conflict, also, the Iranian students seized the American Embassy in Teheran and American press and public was transfixed by actions there. Of critical importance in the shifting relationship with Iran was the fact that America lost important listening posts to spy on the Soviet Union and watch the deployment of soviet missiles. The Chinese were able to make another deal with the Carter administration, offering to set up a new listening post in Northwest China at a secret outpost just outside Urumchi. The project, called Project 851, involves American software and Hardware, about 100 personnel from the NSA and an equal number of Chinese military personnel who occupy the post with the Americans and have been trained to use American spy materials. This post, 851, had been over the years, absolutely uninterrupted by the domestic situation in China. As the Chinese say of the post, "politics is politics and busines is business." They look on the 851 project as a business propostion.
uniform with the Chinese military officers working in uniform with Chinese military officials. You have the army intelligence people in uniform, because of the mutual agreement between the two countries. Because of a mutual agreement between the two countries, they were allowed to operate in China, for intelligence purposes. I am talking about a special intelligence gathering complex in North China, in the Northwest with Americans in uniform, and the common enemy at this station is the late Soviet Union. And a lot of the English speaking Chinese officers in that complex, where is this post.(XXXX).The problem in terms of myself, as to who knows where it is? I am crossing the border ]